| Creators: |
Luzuriaga, Miguel and Kunze, Oliver |
| Title: |
A Gift-exchange with Probabilistc Payoffs |
| Item Type: |
Article or issue of a publication series |
| Projects: |
ILR |
| Journal or Series Title: |
International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics : IJABE |
| Date: |
October 2017 |
| Divisions: |
Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Abstract (ENG): |
Ample experimental evidence demonstrates a positive wage-effort relationship in which the results from the employee’s effort lead to deterministic firm’ payoffs. We thus investigate a reframed version of the gift-exchange game by Fehr et al. (1998) in which the firms’ payoffs can take two values and one of them is randomly determined by an external process after the effort choice has been made. We find that effort levels are significantly lower when payoffs are probabilistic than when they are deterministic. As a consequence, high waging is profitable in the deterministic, but not in the probabilistic condition. Moreover, the treatment effect is strongest among firms which offer high wages. |
| Forthcoming: |
No |
| Language: |
English |
| Link eMedia: |
Download |
| Citation: |
Luzuriaga, Miguel and Kunze, Oliver
(2017)
A Gift-exchange with Probabilistc Payoffs.
International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics : IJABE, 6 (4).
ISSN 2160-9802
|
